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Henry Rose
HOW THE SUPREME COURT
DIMINISHED THE RIGHT TO
VOTE AND WHAT CONGRESS
CAN DO ABOUT IT
Introduction
The right to vote in the United States has always been steeped in discrimination. For most of United States history, it was a right that African
Americans, Asian Americans, American Indians, and women were denied.
The United States Supreme Court in the 1960s and 1970s developed legal
doctrine that required state-created restrictions on the right to vote to be
reviewed by courts with strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. In 2008, the Supreme Court
inexplicably reduced the level of judicial scrutiny used to review new state
voting restrictions in Crawfordv. Marion County Election Bd.1
This article traces the history of Supreme Court review of state restrictions on the right to vote and highlights the significant diminution ofjudicial
review of such restrictions that Crawfordrepresents. After Crawford,many
States enacted laws requiring registered voters to present identification
documentation at the polling place, creating new impediments for some
Americans to vote. In some states, federal courts have determined that these
voter identification laws were purposely enacted to make it more difficult for
African Americans to vote in violation of their constitutional rights under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Congress has the authority under
these Amendments to enact legislation that seeks to prevent and remedy state
restrictions on voting that violate the Constitution.
Provisions in the Constitution involving the right to vote
The initial U.S. Constitution that was ratified in 1788 did not explicitly
identify who had the right to vote. The initial Constitution provided that
members of the House of Representatives in the Congress of the United
States would be chosen by the people of the states and the qualifications for
electing them would be the same as for electing representatives of the most
numerous branch of each state legislature.2 The Seventeenth Amendment
ratified in 1913 adopted the same criterion for electing members of the Senate
of the United States.3 The initial Constitution also provided that each state's
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legislature would determine a method for appointing their electors of the
President of the United States of America.4 As a result of these provisions
in the U.S. Constitution, the states determine the qualifications for voting in
federal and state elections.5
History of discrimination in voting in the United States
After the initial Constitution was ratified, only white male property owners
could vote in eleven of the original thirteen States. Women were not granted
the right to vote in federal and state elections until the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified in 1920.' American Indians born in the United States were
not granted U.S. citizenship until the enactment of the Indian Citizenship
8
Act of 1924, but many States continued to not allow them to register to vote.
Many citizens were also prohibited from voting based on national origin. For
example, California's second Constitution, ratified in 1879, provided that "no
native of China" shall ever be allowed to vote in California.9
The right of African Americans to vote has a uniquely sordid history. As
slaves, they had no right to vote. 10 After the Civil War, slavery was abolished
by the Thirteenth Amendment11, the newly freed slaves were granted citizenship by the Fourteenth Amendment12 and the right to vote by the Fifteenth
Amendment.13 However, in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
century many southern States adopted constitutional provisions, statutes
and voter registration practices that denied African Americans the right
to vote. 14 As a result of these laws and practices, voter registration among
African Americans in many southern States was very low.15 For example,
in Mississippi where African American adults outnumbered white adults in
16
1890, less than 9,000 of 147,000 adult African Americans were registered.
By 1965, only 6.7 percent of eligible African Americans in Mississippi were
registered to vote.1 As a result of this type of low voter registration of African
Americans, the Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965.18
Constitutional limitations on state authority to set qualifications to vote
When state residents believe that states have unfairly restricted qualifications for voting, the residents can challenge the restrictions under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. In Guinn
v. United States,19 the U.S. Supreme Court held that an amendment to the
Oklahoma constitution that required a person seeking to register to vote to
pass a literacy test unless the person was eligible to vote on January 1, 1866
or was a descendant of a person who was eligible to vote on that date violated
the Fifteenth Amendment because it discriminated on the basis of race. 0 In
Nixon v. Herndon,21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Texas statute that
barred African Americans from voting in the Democratic Party primary
violated their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2
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In famous footnote four to United States v. Carolene Products Co. 3 the
U.S. Supreme Court presaged the different levels ofjudicial scrutiny of state
action that would eventually develop in equal protection jurisprudence.2 4 The
CaroleneProducts Court suggested in footnote four that legislation that restricts the right to vote should receive "more exacting judicial scrutiny" under
equal protection because it involves legislation that restricts the "political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation."25 In Harper v.Virginia State Board of Elections,6 which
held that a provision of the Virginia Constitution that made payment of a poll
tax a precondition to voting violated equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment,2 7 the U.S. Supreme Court noted that governmental restrictions
28
on the right to vote should be "closely scrutinized and carefully confined.
The type ofjudicial scrutiny that courts should apply to State restrictions
on the right to vote under equal protection was firmly established in Kramer
v. Union FreeSchool District.9 In Kramer,a New York state statute limited
voting in school district elections to residents who own or lease taxable real
property in the district or who have children enrolled in the district's schools.3 0
Mr. Kramer, a childless bachelor who lived in his parents' home and neither
owned nor leased taxable real property, challenged the denial of his application to vote in a local school board election on equal protection grounds. 1 The
U.S. Supreme Court held that in considering Mr.Kramer's equal protection
claim "the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to
promote a compelling state interest."32 The Court stated that the New York
state statute that prevented Mr. Kramer from voting in school board elections
must be given "close and exacting examination" because the right to vote:
is preservative of otherbasic civil and political rights; constitutes the foundation of our representative society; and determines who may participate
in political affairs or in the selection of public officials and any unlawful
discrimination in voting undermines the legitimacy of representative
government.33
For these reasons, the Court in Kramer found that State restrictions on the
right to vote are not entitled to the presumption of constitutionality that is
generally afforded State statutes.3 4 The Court concluded that the New York
statute in question was not sufficiently tailored to limit the right to vote to those
primarily interested" in school affairs and, therefore, it violated equal protection to deny Mr. Kramer the right to vote in local school board elections. 5
In Dunn v. Blumstein,3 6 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated on equal protection grounds a provision of the Tennessee Constitution that limited voting to
residents who had lived in Tennessee for twelve months and in their county of
residence for three months . 7 In reviewing the constitutionality of Tennessee's
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durational residence requirements, the Dunn Court recognized that the strict
scrutiny test announced in Kramer applied to equal protection challenges to
State laws that restrict the right to vote. 8 The Dunn Court also emphasized
that a State law that restricts the right to vote is presumed to be unconstitutional unless the State meets a "heavy burden ofjustification" demonstrating
that the law is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. 9
It was settled after Kramer and Dunn that courts should apply strict scrutiny
review to equal protection challenges to State laws that restrict the right to
vote. 40 Constitutional scholars also acknowledge that "laws infringing on the
right to vote must meet strict scrutiny."41
Voter identification laws
In the twentieth century, several states requested that voters present some
form of identification at the polling place but provisions existed for voters in
these states to be able to cast a ballot even if they did not have the requested
ID. 42 By 2000, fourteen states requested that voters present an identification
43
document at the polling place.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board
In 2005, Indiana enacted a statute (hereafter referred to as "SEA 483")
requiring its citizens who appear in person to vote to present a governmentissued photo identification. 44 Under SEA 483, if a prospective voter fails to
present such identification, (s)he may file a provisional ballot that will be
counted only if (s)he presents the required government-issued photo identi45
fication to the circuit court clerk's office within 10 days.
The Indiana Democratic Party and several other plaintiffs sued Todd
Rokita, the Indiana Secretary of State, the Marion County Election Board
and several other government defendants in federal district court in Indiana
challenging the constitutionality of SEA 483.46 The district court judge found
that an estimated 43,000 Indiana residents, or 0.9 percent of Indiana's voting
aging population, lacked a state-issued photo identification. 47 In considering
plaintiffs' equal protection challenge to SEA 483, the district judge decided
that strict scrutiny did not apply because the plaintiffs failed to prove that any
voters would be adversely impacted by SEA 483 and instead cited the following test for reviewing the plaintiff's equal protection challenge to SEA 483:
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh "the
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate"
against "the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for
the burden imposed by its rule," taking into consideration "the extent to
which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights."48
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The district court cited the following U.S. Supreme Court cases as the
source of this test: Burdickv. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,434 (1992), quoting from
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-89 (1983).' 9 Applying this test,
the district court concluded that Indiana's important interest in preventing
voter fraud justified the restrictions on voting imposed by SEA 483.50 Thus,
the District court concluded that SEA 483's requirement that voters present
a government-issued photo identification at the polling place is a permissible
regulation of elections by the State of Indiana51 and rejected the plaintiffs'
equal protection challenge to the statute.52
The plaintiffs appealed the district judge's decision to the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals and the majority there also rejected reviewing SEA 483
with strict scrutiny, relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Anderson
and Burdick.53 The Seventh Circuit majority affirmed the district court's
decision finding SEA 483 to be a constitutional exercise of Indiana's authority under Article I, section 4 of the U.S. Constitution to impose reasonable
regulations on the electoral process in Indiana.54 One member of the Seventh
Circuit panel dissented identifying the obvious purpose of SEA 483 to be to
discourage turnout among Democratic voters.55 The dissenting judge urged
that "strict scrutiny light" under Burdick be applied to SEA 483 resulting
in its invalidation as an undue burden on the fundamental right to vote of a
5 6
segment of Indiana's eligible voters.
The Seventh Circuit's decision that SEA 483 is constitutional was appealed
to the U. S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court affirmed without a majority opinion.5 Justice Stevens, writing the lead opinion for three justices, also
applied Anderson and Burdick and concluded that the evidence presented to
the district court was not sufficient to support a facial attack on SEA 483 in
its entirety, necessitating an affirmance. 8 Justice Stevens found that Indiana
voters who possess government-issued photo identification are not unconstitutionally burdened by the requirement of presenting it before voting.5 9 Justice
Stevens recognized that some persons in Indiana who are eligible to vote but
who do not possess a current photo identification may be unconstitutionally
burdened by SEA 483 but concluded that the evidence in the record made
it impossible to assess the burden on them. 6 Accordingly, Justice Stevens
found that the plaintiffs' facial attack on SEA 483 failed because the statute's
effect on the vast majority of Indiana voters is justified by the State's interest
61
in protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral process.
Justice Scalia, who also wrote for three justices, applied the Anderson and
Burdick precedents and affirmed the district court's holding that SEA 483
is constitutional. 62 However, Justice Scalia took issue with Justice Stevens'
suggestion that SEA 483 may be unconstitutional as applied to some eligible
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voters in Indiana.63 Justice Scalia found that a generally applicable voter law,
like SEA 483, should be constitutionally reviewed based on its burden on most
voters and not on how it might burden discreet sub-classes of the eligible voter
population and the burden that SEA 483 imposes on most Indiana voters is
64
reasonable, satisfying equal protection.
Justice Souter, writing for two justices, dissented. 65 Justice Souter asserted
that Justice Stevens in the lead opinion underestimated the serious burdens
that SEA 483 places on those eligible Indiana voters who do not possess a
government-issued photo identification. 66 Further, Justice Souter found that
Indiana's principal interest in preventing voter fraud is discounted by the
fact that Indiana admitted that it cannot document a single instance of voter
fraud in the State's history. 67 Justice Souter concluded, applying the standards
created in Anderson and Burdick, that SEA 483 is unconstitutional because
the State's interests fail to justify the burdens on the right to vote that it imposes, especially on the old and the poor who may have difficulty obtaining
the required voter identification documentation. 68 Justice Breyer dissented
separately and also concluded that SEA 483 is unconstitutional because it
imposes a burden on eligible voters who lack a government-issued identifica69
tion that is disproportionate to the State's interests in the statute.
Critique of the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford
The principal critique of the Supreme Court's decision in Crawfordis that
it ignored legal precedent in Kramer and Dunn that applied to State laws
that restrict the right to vote, like SEA 483, and instead applied precedent in
Anderson and Burdick that is tangential to that right. Crawfordinvolved an
equal protection challenge to SEA 483. Prior to the enactment of SEA 483,
a registered voter seeking to vote in person in Indiana had to simply sign a
poll book and if the signature matched the signature in the voting registration
records, the voter could cast a ballot.70 After enactment of SEA 483, Indiana
voters seeking to vote in person were also required to present a government-issued photo identification in order to vote.71 Thus, SEA 483 created
a new restriction on the right of registered voters in Indiana to cast a ballot.
Kramer and Dunn both involved constitutional challenges to State laws
that prevented otherwise eligible voters from casting ballots. In Kramer
and Dunn, the Supreme Court was emphatic that when State-law created
restrictions on the right to vote are challenged on equal protection grounds
the Courts should apply strict scrutiny and only uphold such restrictions if
they are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
Anderson and Burdick, on the other hand, did not involve restrictions on
the ability of any person to vote. Anderson was a constitutional challenge
to an Ohio statute that required independent candidates for President to file
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their candidacy documents in March in order to appear on the general election ballot the following November.71 Burdick was a constitutional challenge
to Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting.7 The provisions of the Ohio and
Hawaii State laws that were challenged inAnderson and Burdickrespectively
did not prevent any eligible voter in these States from casting a ballot.
Prof Erwin Chemerinsky, a constitutional law scholar, filed an Amicus
Curiae brief in the Supreme Court in Crawford urging the Court to clarify
the doctrinal confusion that has arisen in lower courts, including in the lower
courts in Crawford,in cases involving constitutional challenges to State laws
that directly deny citizens their right to vote. 74 Professor Chemerinsky drew a
distinction between two types of election law cases that had been decided by
the Supreme Court. In the first line of cases (including Kramer and Dunn), the
Supreme Court applied "close scrutiny" to State laws that directly deny the
right to vote and required the laws to be "necessary to promote a compelling
state interest."17' The other line of cases (including Anderson and Burdick)
involved State statutes that indirectly or derivatively impose a burden on the
right to vote and the Supreme Court has held that constitutional challenges
to these laws will be decided based a balancing of the burden on the voters'
rights resulting from the laws and the State's interests that are promoted by
them.7 Professor Chemerinsky urged the Supreme Court to apply the KramerDunn precedents in deciding Crawford and determine whether SEA 483 is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling State interest.7 7 Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court did not adopt Professor Chemerinsky's suggestion and eight
of the nine justices adopted the Anderson-Burdick balancing test to guide
their opinions in Crawford 8 No Supreme Court justice distinguished or
even referred to the Kramer-Dunnprecedents in their opinions in Crawford.
The Kramer-Dunn precedents should have been applied to the plaintiffs'
equal protection challenge in Crawford because SEA 483 imposed a new
restriction on voting that prevented some otherwise eligible Indiana voters
from casting a ballot. The profound interests that Americans have in voting
that were so aptly described in Kramer were frustrated for those registered
Indiana voters who could not cast a ballot because of SEA 483.
Had the Supreme Court properly applied the Kramer-Dunn precedents,
the governmental defendants in Crawford would have had the burden to
establish that SEA 483 was necessary to satisfy a compelling State interest
in combatting voter fraud.79 It is difficult to comprehend how the defendants
in Crawford could have met this burden when Indiana failed to present any
80
evidence that in person voter fraud had ever occurred in State history.
By not applying the Kramer-Dunn precedents to decide Crawford, the
Supreme Court diminished significantly the constitutional protection of
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the right of Americans to vote. The Anderson-Burdick line of cases simply
require a balancing of the interests of voters against the interests of the State
in the electoral process. The Kramer-Dunn line of cases, on the other hand,
requires States that pass laws that restrict the right to vote to justify such
laws as necessary to promote a compelling government interest. The right
of Americans to vote deserves the strongest protections that the Constitution
affords 81 and the U.S. Supreme Court should have applied the Kramer-Dunn
precedents in Crawford.
Constitutional challenges to state photo ID laws after Crawford
Constitutional challenges to State photo identification laws did not abate
but rather increased after Crawfordwas decided by the Supreme Court. Since
a majority of the justices in Crawfordrecognized that some eligible Indiana
voters might have their constitutional right to vote violated by the operation
of SEA 483,82 constitutional challenges to state voter identification laws have
been brought after Crawfordby individuals and members of discreet groups
83
who are burdened by such laws.
After Crawfordwasdecided by the Supreme Court, implementation of voter
identification laws have been found to violate the constitutional rights of:
African Americans in North Carolina; 84 voters in Wisconsin who are entitled
to free IDs which will enable them to vote; 85 and eligible American Indian
86
voters who lack statutorily-required voter identification in North Dakota.
The Fifth Circuit, sitting in en banc, held that a Texas photo identification law
had a discriminatory effect on minorities' voting rights in violation of Section 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act. 8 A state court judge in Pennsylvania
also held that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's photo ID law violated
the state constitution in that it burdens the fundamental right to vote. 88 These
cases indicate that several state voter identification laws that were enacted
after Crawfordhave been implemented in ways that violate the constitutional
rights of individuals or members of groups who simply seek to vote in state
and federal elections.
Professor Richard L. Hasen, an election law expert, has surveyed the
efficacy of litigation that has challenged state voter identification laws in
the wake of Crawford.89 Professor Hasen recognizes that this litigation is
important because it seeks to enfranchise voters who face special burdens
obtaining acceptable voter identification credentials.90 However, he asserts
that the litigation challenging voter identification laws imposes substantial
burdens and costs on voters, voter advocacy groups, courts, government
entities and their agencies. 91 He also asserts that voter identification laws
contribute to voter confusion and discouragement and that administrative
errors in their implementation further disenfranchise voters. 92 He contends
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that what is often lost in the intense focus on addressing the myriad problems
created by voter identification laws is that the "evidence that such laws prevent
impersonation fraud or instill voter confidence is essentially non-existent."93
Professor Hasen concludes that states should be required by courts to provide
actual evidence that they have good reasons for burdening voters with these
identification requirements and that the means used are closely connected
to these reasons.94 Of course, strict scrutiny review by the courts of voter
identification laws would require states to provide the type of justification
for these laws that Professor Hasen seeks.

Congress's authority to address state voter identification laws
Although a majority of the Supreme Court justices in Crawford declined
to find Indiana's voter identification law to be facially unconstitutional,
subsequent lower federal court decisions have found state-created voter
identification laws to be unconstitutional as applied to members of discreet
groups, including racial minorities. The United States Congress has the
authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to enact legislation to prevent and remedy violations of the substantive provisions of these
Amendments. 95 Congressional action in response to another discriminatory
electoral practice, literacy tests, illustrates the type of legislation that Congress could enact to prevent or remedy the unconstitutional violations that
state voter identification laws have spawned.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many states enacted
literacy tests that required prospective voters to establish their proficiency
in reading and/or writing English as a requirement for voting. The Supreme
Court held in 1959 that literacy tests are constitutional, absent proof of racial
discrimination in their application. 96 However, Congress later determined
that literacy tests were used, especially in southern states, to prevent African
Americans from voting and as a result their use in these states was suspended
for five years by the Voting Rights Act of 1965.97 South Carolina, one of the
states whose literacy test was suspended, challenged Congress's authority
to suspend its literacy test.98 The Supreme Court held that the suspension of
South Carolina's literacy test was a proper exercise of Congress's authority
under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment because Congress had determined that South Carolina's literacy test had been instituted and administered
to prevent African Americans from voting. 99 In the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
Congress also provided that certain persons of Puerto Rican descent could not
be denied the right to vote due to an inability to read or write English"' and
the Supreme Court upheld Congress's authority to enact this provision under
1
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in Katzenbackv.Morgan."'
In 1970,
Congress amended the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to suspend literacy tests in
all federal, state and local elections for a period of five years.102 Oregon and
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several other states challenged Congress' authority to suspend the use of all
literacy tests but the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that Congress had
the authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to suspend
them in all jurisdictions because they had been used to discriminate against
voters on the basis of race.103
As with state literacy tests, Congress can enact laws that seek to prevent
or remedy the unconstitutional applications of state voter identification
laws. This power extends to suspending their use in federal and state elections because they have been applied in a racially discriminatory manner.
Congress could prohibit states from requiring voters to present identification documentation as a qualification for casting a ballot. Such a prohibition
would prevent states from enacting voter identification laws, which suppress
voter turnout, 104 without evidence that in-person voter fraud is a widespread
problem in American elections. Congress should act to make it easier for
Americans to vote, not more difficult.
Conclusion
The right to vote in America is a precious right. Americans have fought and
died to expand and protect it. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Crawford
constitutes a substantial diminution of the constitutional protection of the
right of Americans to vote. Congress should enact legislation that prohibits
state-created restrictions on voting, such as voter identification laws. Only
then will the right of Americans to vote be protected commensurate to its
importance in our democratic and republican form of government.
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